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Theo A. F. Kuipers
COHERENCE
REPLY TO GERARD VREESWIJK 
In a way, Gerard Vreeswijk’s contribution could better be seen as a 
contribution to a Volume in Debate with Paul Thagard, so a reply by Paul 
Thagard would be more interesting than one from me. In particular for 
Vreeswijk himself, I hope that Thagard will reply in some way or other. Be 
that as it may, I am pleased that the present volume stimulated Vreeswijk to 
design a new connectionist method that claims to evaluate theories in a way 
that improves on the method advocated by Thagard in terms of his theory of 
explanatory coherence (TEC), implemented in ECHO. Of course, the plausible 
question for me is whether Vreeswijk’s version of TEC, which I will indicate 
by TEC-V, and his implementation in the program KNONET escapes the main 
criticisms that I raised in SiS against TEC/ECHO by comparing that 
combination with my simple principle of the Priority of Explanatory 
Coherence (PES), “implemented” by the even more simple comparative 
Evaluation Matrix (EM). In this reply I will first deal with this question, 
followed by some remarks about the prospects for the computational 
implementation of PES/EM. 
Comparing TEC/ECHO, TEC-V/KNONET, and PES/EM 
Let me start by specifying Vreeswijk’s opening paragraph which, incidentally, 
reflects his typical straightforward style of debate. In SiS I report (p. 313) that 
it took me forty-five minutes to calculate by hand two cases of theory 
comparison, indeed relatively very complicated ones, viz. Copernicus versus 
Ptolemy and Newton versus Descartes, by applying PES/EM on the two cases 
as propositionally structured by Nowak and Thagard (1992). As Vreeswijk 
wrongly suggests, I did not recalculate by hand their computational application 
of TEC/ECHO to these cases. It is all the more true that forty-five minutes is a 
long time, but since it indicates the time of a computation by (head and) hand, 
it nowadays means that an appropriate computer program might do it in a split 
second. Hence, what I did must be computationally very simple indeed.  
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 My points of criticism were in fact two related points. One, “ECHO-
selection” is a non-transparent updating process (p. 306). Two, as long as you 
can achieve the same results in a much more simple way, you should prefer 
that way (p. 310). Of course, the claim that PES/EM is “much more simple” 
than TEC/ECHO should be judged on the basis of a hypothetical computer 
program implementing EM. My additional claim was that all historical 
examples of the products (not the processes) of theory selection reproduced by 
Thagard and his colleagues could be reproduced by PES/EM. My main worry 
about the non-transparency was that considerations of explanatory success and 
simplicity are intermingled by TEC/ECHO, whereas they are clearly separated 
in the PES/EM approach. In my reply to Thagard I make clear that I have in 
principle liberalized my separation claim, leaving room for weighted roles of 
(desired and undesired) empirical and nonempirical features. But first there 
should be a proof that it is needed. That is, the following challenge formulated 
in SiS (p. 313) should first be met:
In general, the challenge of new cases is that they may lead to strong counter-examples of 
the claim that the EM-method reproduces the historical choices: the EM-method might 
prescribe the opposite choice. If there are such cases, our stratified model is descriptively 
inadequate, i.e., even with respect to the simulation of products. 
It is highly questionable whether the only (appealing, hypothetical) example 
suggested to me by Thagard (see my reply to him) viz. the classical theory of 
air, earth, fire, and water, has really ever been found more successful, in a 
generalized, weighted sense, than the phlogiston theory or even the oxygen 
theory (after their conception, of course). Unfortunately, Vreeswijk does not 
provide such cases, either.
One of the main things Vreeswijk argues is that ECHO’s crucial update 
formula (2) can better be replaced by the “gradient ascent” formula (5). Not, 
however, for reasons of greater clarity, but for reasons of greater 
computational speed. Moreover, although his direct connectionist coherence 
approach in Sections 4 and 5 certainly has some plausibility, in terms of the 
transparency of the resulting calculations it is obviously much less effective 
than PES/EM.
In sum, as long as there are no clear historical cases going against PES/EM, 
I take it that there is no need for indirect or direct coherence approaches to 
theory selection. However, I should concede that if such cases were to be 
produced, PES/EM is in trouble and the computational coherence approaches 
of Thagard and Vreeswijk may well be the proper answer. 
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Implementing PES/EM and the Need for Justifying Normative Selection 
Algorithms
At the end of his paper Vreeswijk expresses the hope that somebody will 
implement PES/EM in order to compare it with TEC(-V). I am happy to relate 
that Alexander van den Bosch is far advanced with this project and is 
preparing a paper entitled “Explanatory coherence and the evaluation matrix.” 
One important problem to overcome is that PES/EM, as it is formulated in SiS, 
compares just two theories, whereas TEC in fact compares all pairs of subsets 
of relevant propositions.
 For the moment I would like to confine myself to stressing a point that Van 
den Bosch suggested to me about the paper by Vreeswijk. Although Vreeswijk 
is not very clear about this, it seems clear that he has only normative 
pretensions, in contrast to Thagard, who mainly has historical pretensions, not 
only regarding resulting selections, but also processes of selection. However 
and this is Van den Bosch’s basic point  in contrast to my PES/EM approach, 
which is rooted in the theory of empirical progress and truth approximation as 
developed in ICR, Vreeswijk still has to come up with some justification of his 
constraints, for otherwise you obtain an efficient but non-effective means, for 
the goal to be served is not specified. That is, one may concede that his 
constraints are very efficient, in the sense that they can easily be applied 
computationally. They may also be effective means to achieve some cognitive 
goal, but it is still not clear with respect to which goal they are effective. If 
such a goal could be identified, however, it would represent a convincing 
justification of Vreeswijk’s constraints.
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